Playing the Zone and Controlling the Board: The Emerging Jurisdictional Consensus and the Court of International Trade A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Court by Segal, Scott H. & Orava, Stephen J.
PLAYING THE ZONE AND CONTROLLING
THE BOARD: THE EMERGING
JURISDICTIONAL CONSENSUS AND THE





I. Historical Background of the Court of International
Trade (CIT) ................................ 2398
II. Foreign-Trade Zones Program ................... 2402
A. FTZ Benefits ............................. 2402
B. Categories of FTZs ........................ 2404
C. FrZ Board .............................. 2405
Ill. Jurisdiction of the CIT ........................ 2408
A. Statutory Provisions ........................ 2409
B. Interpretation of the Residual Jurisdiction Section . 2410
IV. Redefinition of the Exclusive Jurisdiction of the CIT .. 2412
A. Judicial Review of FTZ Board Decisions ......... 2412
B. Conoco, Inc. v. United States Foreign-Trade Zones
Board .................................. 2413
1. District Court .......................... 2414
2. Court of International Trade .............. 2414
3. Federal Circuit ......................... 2416
C. Miami Free Zone Corp. v. Foreign Trade Zones Board... 2419
V. Implications of the CIT's Jurisdictional Evolution ..... 2421
A. Positive Implications ....................... 2421
B. Negative Implications ...................... 2425
* Senior associate in the Washington, D.C. office of Bracewell & Patterson, L.L.P. The
author specializes in environment and trade policy and specialized representation relating to
foreign-trade zones.
** Associate in the Washington, D.C. office of Bracewell & Patterson, L.LP. The author
specializes in regulatory and policy issues affecting international trade and transactions.
2393
THE AMERICAN UNVERSriY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:2393
C. Precedential Implications ................... 2428
Conclusion ...................................... 2430
INTRODUCTION
The rough and tumble game of international trade forces its players
to choose political and legal sides to maximize their self-interest. One
recent example is the effort to negotiate a multilateral trade pact.
The recent round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), known as the Uruguay Round, expanded the scope of the
multilateral trading rules established in 1947 under GATT. The
Uruguay Round made great strides in reducing trade barriers,
expanding trading rules to other areas, and providing more guidance
and accountability through new dispute settlement procedures. Of
significant importance, a new World Trade Organization (WTO) was
established to implement new dispute settlement rules, including rules
that, for the first time, prevent a member nation from unilaterally
blocking an adverse decision.' On April 15, 1994, over 110 nations
signed the Uruguay Round Agreements,3 and, after a significant
number of congressional hearings, the President formally submitted
legislation making necessary and appropriate changes to U.S. laws to
implement the agreements.4 Two days after the House of Represen-
tatives approved the Uruguay Round, the Senate also approved the
implementing legislation on December 1, 1994, and, through the
legislative history, placed the United States further on record as
supporting free trade and promoting exports as a central pillar of
economic development in the United States.' Then-Senate Majority
Leader George Mitchell stated, "Expanded international trade has
been the engine of American prosperity since the end of the Second
World War... This trade agreement will define the American role
1. See 140 CONG. REC. S15,379 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1994).
2. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, in THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 404, annex 2 (GATT
Secretariat ed., 1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding].
3. See Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Uruguay Round Trade
Agreements, Texts of Agreements Implementing Bil4 Statement of Administrative Action and Required
Supporting Statements, H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d. Sess., vol. 1, 1324-26 (1994).
4. Id. at 656.
5. SeeHelene Cooper &John Harwood, Major Shifts in TradeAre Ensured as GATI1 Wins U.S.
Approval, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1994, at Al, A9 (stating that Senate voted 76 to 24 to approve
GATr); Helen Dewar, Senate Approves GA7T n Big Bipartisan Vote, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1994, at
Al, A26. GATT is a trade agreement among 124 nations that lowers tariffi by one-third, reduces
subsidies for farm products, strengthens protection for patents, inventions, and recorded
entertainment, and begins to regulate trade in services and investments ld. at A2; David E.
Sanger, Senate Approves Pact to Ease Trade Curbs; a Victory for Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1994, at
Al (stating that GATT cuts tariffs around world by more than $700 billion over next 10 years).
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in the global economy and in world affairs well into the 21st
century."6
One major controversy surrounding the GATT process is the
question of which forum has, the right, and the institutional compe-
tence, to adjudicate disputes among signatory nations or parties.7 An
unusual alliance of consumer organizations, environmentalists, and
certain political conservatives argue that the new WTO, the global
trade governing body that replaced the GATT apparatus, will be "an
all-powerful bureaucracy, able to undercut American sovereignty by
allowing foreign panels of foreign judges to rule on whether Federal
and state laws constitute[] impediments to world trade."8 The
sovereignty concerns raised by the alliance were amplified because the
United States will no longer have the ability to veto unilaterally
adverse decisions in the WTO.9 These criticisms relating to sover-
eignty concerns with the WTO' ° have been contrasted with the
advocacy for uniformity in trade policy. The American Bar Associa-
tion, for example, in its response to the sovereignty issue, termed the
WTO "extremely helpful to U.S. interests" because it "[s]ets up a
single, coherent procedural framework for dealing with a trade issue,
whether related to goods or services.""
Just as ratification of the Uruguay Round marked a continued
commitment to expanded trade on the multilateral level, the domestic
foreign-trade zone program, with its exemptions from Customs fees
and ad valorem taxes, 2 mark an ongoing effort to harmonize domes-
tic U.S. laws in order to make internal commerce more efficient and
thus expand trade. In addition to sharing the GATr/WTO commit-
ment to expand trade, however, the domestic foreign-trade program
also shares the complex issues surroundingjurisdiction. For instance,
similar to arguments made by some commentators that the WTO
presents difficultjurisdictional questions in determining which forum
6. Cooper & Harwood, supra note 5, at Al.
7. SeeRalph Nader, WTO Means Rule by Unaccountable Tribunals, WALL ST.J., Aug. 17,1994,
at A12 (arguing that domestic consumer, worker, and environmental safeguards could be
undermined ifjurisdiction for trade disputes is ceded to WTO dispute settlement panels that
can render decisions without protection of U.S. veto power).
8. Sanger, supra note 5, at A22.
9. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 2.
10. See Nader, supra note 7, at A12 (stating that Wro tribunals will undermine decisions
on trade disputes made by disputing nations).
11. Letter from R. William Ide III, President, American Bar Association, to the Honorable
Daniel P. Moynihan and the Honorable Dan Rostenkowski 3 (May 5, 1994) (on file with The
American University Law Review).
12. Ad valorem taxes are "imposed on the value of property." BLACK's LAW DiCTIONARY 51
(6th ed. 1991).
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is appropriate to resolve trade disputes, 3 the foreign-trade zone
program14 also faces thorny judicial review questions within the
domestic courts of the United States."5 Like the debate over the
WTO's jurisdiction, the question of the appropriate forum to review
decisions regarding the grant of foreign-trade zones and subzones is
subject to competing interests of local concerns and uniformity. This
debate revolves around the U.S. Court of International Trade
(CIT) ,16 with its institutional competence in dealing with trade
issues, on one hand, and the federal district courts, which are
potentially more attuned to important local concerns, on the other
hand. Just as Congress has defined U.S. support for the WTO
notwithstanding the competing interests voiced during the debate, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit1 7 has recently attempt-
ed to resolve the appropriate jurisdiction for foreign-trade zone
issues." In general, appeals from Foreign-Trade Zones Board (FTZ
Board) actions may be brought (1) to the court of appeals in the
district where the zone is located, in the case of revocation; 9 (2) to
the CIT if the requisite jurisdiction can be shown; or (3) to district
courts under the Administrative Procedures Act.
20
As the significance of international trade in the U.S. economy
increases and as the global marketplace becomes more sophisticated,
the U.S. court system's role in adjudicating trade disputes will
inevitably increase. The evolution of the CIT provides insight into
how the U.S. judicial system seeks to provide uniformity in the
resolution of trade disputes.-1 Historically, interpretations of the
CIT's jurisdiction have failed to provide parties with guidance in
13. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 54-77 and accompanying text (explaining operation offoreign-trade zone
program).
15. See Miami Free Zone Corp. v. Foreign Trade Zones Bd., 22 F.3d 1110, 1111 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (holding that Court of International Trade (CIT) has exclusive jurisdiction to review
actions of Foreign-Trade Zones Board (FTZ Board), including grant of zone application in
particular geographic location); Conoco, Inc. v. United States Foreign-Trade Zones Bd., 18 F.3d
1581, 1585, 1589 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding that statutory grant of exclusive jurisdiction to CIT
over civil actions arising out of federal statutes governing revenues from imports provides CIT
with jurisdiction to review FTZ Board's imposition of conditions on grants of foreign trade
subzones).
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 251 (1988) (establishing IT).
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (5) (establishing that Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over
appeals from final decisions of CIT).
18. See Conoco, 18 F.Sd at 1590 (concluding that CIT erred in acquiescing to Government's
arguments and not exercisingjurisdiction over FIZ Board's imposition of conditions on grants
of foreign trade subzones).
19. See 19 U.S.C. § 81r(c) (1988).
20. See5 U.S.C. § 701-53 (1988).
21. See infra notes 27-52 and accompanying text (discussing historical development of CIT).
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choosing the appropriate forum for seeking judicial relief.22 Both
the CIT and the U.S. district courts have been struggling to define the
scope of jurisdiction for trade disputes, defining which forum has
jurisdiction over which type of dispute. 3 The lack of certainty over
the appropriate jurisdictional boundaries has caused considerable
confusion and costs as parties attempt to resolve increasingly complex
issues that affect trade throughout the United States.24 In recent
decisions, however, both U.S. district courts and the CIT have taken
significant steps to define the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT.25
Although these decisions only grant the CIT exclusive jurisdiction in
the area of foreign-trade zones, the expansion could logically flow to
other trade disputes under revenue and non-revenue raising statutory
frameworks designed to facilitate increased trade. Therefore, as
international trade disputes increase, parties may find more guidance
in choosing the appropriate forum for resolving those disputes, and
international trade law jurisprudence may take a step toward greater
unifohnity.
This Article will provide an overview of the changing jurisdiction of
the CIT and discuss possible implications of this change on the wide
array of trade disputes. Part I will briefly outline the historic
evolution of the CIT and its jurisdictional mandate. Part II will
provide background on the foreign-trade zones program. This
program represents one of the first areas of trade law in which CIT
jurisdictional issues have become more defined.
26 Part III will
describe the existing jurisdictional statute of the CIT. Part IV will
examine recent decisions of the Federal Circuit, the district courts,
and the CIT that define the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT as it
relates to foreign-trade zones. Part V will analyze the positive and
22. See H.L REP. No. 1235,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CA.N.
3729, 3730 [hereinafter COMMITTE REPORT] (explaining that many suits involving international
trade issues were brought in federal district courts rather than CIT because it was difficult to
determine in advance whether particular case would fall within jurisdictional scheme of CIT);
Gregory W. Carman, Jurisdiction and the Court of International Trade: Remarks of the Honorable
Gregory W. Carman at the Conference on International Business Practice Presented by the CenterforDispute
Resolution on February 27-28, 1992, 13 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 245, 250 (1992) (stating that CIT's
jurisdiction, as interpreted by courts, creates confusing and costly jurisdictional maze denying
litigants access to CIT to resolve legitimate customs and international trade disputes).
23. See infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text (discussing problems posed by confusing
jurisdictional authority of CIT).
24. See Conoco, Inc. v. United States Foreign-Trade Zones Bd., 790 F. Supp. 279, 288-89 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1992) (stating that individuals and firms-spend tremendous amounts of time and
money trying to navigate jurisdictional scheme outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 1581), re,'d, 18 F.3d 1581
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
25. See supra note 15 (discussing holdings in Conoco, 18 F.3d 1581 and Miami Free Zone
Corp. v. Foreign Trade Zones Bd., 22 F.3d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
26. See infra notes 54-77 and accompanying text (discussing foreign-trade zones).
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negative implications of this jurisdictional evolution and will evaluate
this evolution in the context of the role of specialized courts. Finally,
this Article will analyze the possible implications of these decisions on
other areas of trade disputes.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CoURT OF INTERNAIONAL
TRADE (CIT)
The CIT originated from the need to provide uniform review of the
classification of imported goods and the enforcement of tariffs
imposed under Article I of the U.S. Constitution.27 In 1890, Con-
gress established the Board of General Appraisers to review decisions
of the Bureau of Customs regarding classification of imported goods
and tariff issues.28 The Board of General Appraisers represented the
first forum designed for the specialized review of actions of adminis-
trative agencies.29" In 1926, the Board of General Appraisers was
renamed the United States Customs Court, an Article I court." Its
powers and jurisdiction remained relatively the same.3 Thirty years
later, the Customs Court was given Article III status.3 2 This change
converted the Customs Court from functions "directed to the
execution of one or more such powers... prescribed by Congress"
27. See also Carman, supra note 22, at 246 (explaining historical background of CIT). The
U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and to
"lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imports and Excises." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
28. SeeAdministrative Customs Act, ch. 407, 26 Stat. 131 (1890) (creating Board of General
Appraisers and delineating scope of Board's authority). The Board of General Appraisers was
established to oversee the appraisal and classification of goods imported into the United States
to ensure that the methods of appraisal and classification were applied uniformly. Id. at 136.
29. See Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U.
PA. L. REv. 1111, 1111 n.3 (1990).
30. Act of May 28, 1926, ch. 411, 44 Stat. 669. Article I courts are generally designed as
specialized courts to review administrative action and only possess those powers conferred on
them by statute. See Symposium, The United States Court of International Trade. Perspectives from the
First AnnualJudicial Conference. (Preface), 58 ST.JOHN'S L. REv. 685, 688-89 (1984) (discussing
important role CIT plays by providing judicial review of administrative actions of government
agencies dealing with importations). Article III courts are created as part of the judicial branch
of government and have all the powers in law and equity possessed by, or conferred by statute,
upon a U.S. district court. Id. at 689 (discussing authority of Article III courts). The Customs
Courts Act of 1980 "reaffirmed and perfected" the Article III status of the CIT and allowed the
Court to provide aggrieved parties with appropriate and complete relief. Id. at 688. The CIT
is the only national trial court established under Article III of the Constitution. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 251(a) (1988); see also Carman, supra note 22, at 248-49 (explaining that CIT's jurisdiction
includes civil suits arising from numerous types of actions by agencies as result of import
transactions).
31. See COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 19, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. at 3730
(explaining that while 1926 Act sought to provide greater judicial review and uniformity in
decisionmaking process, it did not make any essential changes in function, duties, orjurisdiction
of new court).
32. See28 U.S.C. § 251(a) (stating that CIT is established underArticle III of Constitution).
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with specified tenure33 to functions integrated into the U.S. court
"structure, organization, and procedure."" The change in status
meant that CIT judges were granted life-tenure. 5 The permanence
that accompanies life-tenure served to enhance institutional compe-
tence overall.3 6
In 1970, Congress made "sweeping procedural reforms,"17 and in
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,8 Congress expanded the
Customs Court's jurisdiction to include the granting of "new and
increased responsibilities in the field of international trade litigation,
particularly with regard to antidumping and countervailing [sic] duty
cases." 9 Antidumping and countervailing duty cases arise under
U.S. laws governing unfair trade practices and generally impose duties
on imported goods to remedy unfair or discriminatory pricing and
foreign subsidization of production, respectively.' The 1979 Act
also authorized the Customs Court to grant, for the first time,
injunctive relief in certain customs cases.41 In 1980, the Customs
Court was finally granted the power both to issue monetaryjudgments
and provide equitable relief.42
At this point in the CIT's evolution, significant confusion existed as
to the appropriate role of this specialized court in adjudicating
increasingly complex international trade disputes.' The Honorable
33. See genera!!y NATIONAL ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT MANUAL 74-75 (1989) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT MANUAL].
34. d.
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 252 (1988) (stating that judges are appointed for life and hold office
during good behavior).
36. See GOVERNMENT MANUAL, supra note 33, at 74-75.
37. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 18, repfinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. at 3730; see also
H.R. REP. NO. 267, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 322 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.CA.N. 3188, 3191
(stating that purpose of bill, which was enacted as Customs Court Act of 1970, was to modernize
judicial procedures in Customs Court to enable agencies to cope effectively with expanding
workload).
38. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1994) (increasing responsibilities of Customs Court in international
trade litigation, particularly with regard to antidumping and countervailing duties cases).
39. COMMrTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. at 3730. The
Customs Court's increased role in deciding antidumping and countervailing duties issues has
had a net effect of increasing the number of suits challenging governmental determinations in
these areas. Id.
40. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-71h, 1673-73h (1994).
41. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. at 3730
(explaining how grant of authority to issue injunctive relief significantly broadened CIT's
authority).
42. See COMMrrTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. at 3730
(explaining that prior to receiving authority to issue money judgments and equitable relief,
Customs Court could only agree or disagree with decision of administrative agency).
43. SeeCarman, supranote 22, at247 (discussingfactthatmanysuits involving international
trade issues started in federal district court instead of U.S. Customs Court because of difficulty
of determining in advance whether particular case fell within Customs Court's jurisdictional
scope and because Customs Court's powers were limited).
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Gregory W. Carman, a current judge on the CIT, characterized this
confusion as "a jigsaw puzzle with so many missing pieces that it was
difficult for everyone except the closest observer to discover what the
completed puzzle was intended to show."44
Such confusion manifested itself in a conflict between the federal
district courts and the Customs Court. Because parties were uncertain
at the time of filing whether the Customs Court had jurisdiction over
a particular matter, parties would file in the district courts.45 In an
effort to preserve the exclusive jurisdiction of the Customs Court to
review only those controversies relating to imports, the district courts
would often dismiss these suits, thereby upholding the constitutional
requirement that duties be uniform throughout the United States.
46
As a result, parties seeking relief in international trade disputes were
faced with a difficult choice as to the correct forum for judicial
review, and the opportunity for relief remained uncertain depending
on whether the litigant could persuade a particular court that it had
jurisdiction over a particular dispute. Litigants began forum shopping
and had to make strategic decisions as to the appropriate court in
which to file. They also had difficult hurdles to overcome in
convincing a particular court that jurisdiction was proper. These
contentious litigation decisions cost the parties and thejudicial system
time and money.47 Even more problematic than parties' confusion
over jurisdiction was that judicial decisions originating in district
courts and the Customs Court lacked uniformity.48 Ironically, the
Customs Court which was created, at least in part, to promote
uniformity, resulted in even more confusion.49
44. Carman, supra note 22, at 247; see also Customs Courts Act of 1980: Hearings on H.MR 6394
Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciay, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1980) [hereinafter Hearings], quoted in COMMnTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at
18-19, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. at 3730 (explaining problems with Customs Courts'
authority and jurisdictional limitations prior to Customs Courts Act of 1980).
45. CoMMrTTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 19, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. at 3730-31
(explaining that suits involving international trade issues were instituted in federal district court
because of greater certainty of court's jurisdiction and better chance for obtaining appropriate
relief for alleged injuries).
46. COMMrTEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 19, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. at 3731
(explaining how most district courts refused to entertain international trade suits because of
constitutional requirement of uniformity in decisions relating to imports).
47. COMMrI-I REPORT, supra note 22, at 19, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3731
(explaining that Congress responded to jurisdictional uncertainty of Customs Court because it
was concerned that persons with real grievances were wasting time and resources and were still
not successfully obtaining judicial review of merits of their case).
48. See Carman, supra note 22, at 248 (referencing inconsistentjudicial decisions emerging
from Customs Court and district courts).
49. See Carman, supra note 22, at 248 (mentioning Senator Dennis DeConcini's statement
that Customs Courts Act of 1980 was intended to eliminatejurisdictional confusion for purpose
of gaining more uniformity).
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In order to resolve this 'Jigsaw puzzle" approach to jurisdiction,
Congress enacted the Customs Courts Act of 1980.50 As a prelimi-
nary step, this legislation changed the name of the Customs Court to
the Court of International Trade in order to "more accurately
describe[] the court's clarified and expanded jurisdiction and its new
judicial functions relating to international trade."" Congress sought
to reemphasize and clarify its intent that the expertise and national
jurisdiction of the CIT be used exclusively in resolutions of disputes
arising out of tariff and international trade laws. This clarification
and expansion of the CIT's jurisdiction was an attempt to "eliminate
the considerable jurisdictional confusion" between the federal district
courts and the CIT and to "increase the availability of judicial review
in the field of international trade in a manner which results in
uniformity without sacrificing the expeditious resolution of import-
related disputes."52 To establish its goal, Congress enacted a catch-
all jurisdictional provision to expand the CIT's exclusive jurisdiction
through a residual jurisdiction provision.
Although this redefinition of the CIT'sjurisdiction did not immedi-
ately end the confusion, recent decisions of the CIT in the area of
foreign-trade zones suggest that both the CIT and the district courts
are now moving in a direction that will provide more clarity in the
scope of the CIT's exclusive jurisdiction and more uniformity in the
future resolution of international trade disputes.53 The exercise of
the CIT's jurisdiction in foreign-trade zones cases provides the most
definitive example of the evolution of congressional intent to provide
certainty in the forum for resolving trade disputes through the
removal ofjurisdictional conflict and forum shopping. Foreign-trade
zones provide the clearest example because review of FTZ Board
actions are not covered by the provisions explicitly granting exclusive
jurisdiction to the CIT. Instead, FTZ Board actions, other than
revocation, can only fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT
if the catch-all residual jurisdiction provision applies. Thus, the
application of the residual provision is the area where the courts can
assert additional exclusive jurisdiction.
50. Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417,94 Stat. 1727 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
51. COMMrITEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 20, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CjA.N. at 3732.
52. 126 CONG. REc. 27,063 (1980); seealsoCOMMITTEEREPORT, supranote 22, at20, reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. at 3732 (referring to Senator DeConcini's statement that law would
eliminate much jurisdictional confusion and increase access to courts for litigants in
international trade).
53. See supra note 15 (discussing holdings in Conoco and Miami Free Zone Cop.).
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HI. FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES PROGRAM
The Foreign-Trade Zones Act of 1934 (FTZ Act), as amended, 4
created the FTZ Board in the Department of Commerce and
authorized the FTZ Board to establish the foreign-trade zones (FTZ)
program to expedite and to encourage foreign commerce through
the formation of geographic areas in which corporations engaged in
international trade could realize substantial Customs costs savings.55
FTZs are "special enclosed area[s] within or adjacent to ports of entry,
usually located at industrial parks or in terminal warehouse facili-
ties."56 FTZs provide Customs cost benefits because they are not
considered part of U.S. territory and are therefore exempt from
formal Customs entry procedures and requirements." The FTZ Act
also authorized the FTZ Board to review and approve applications for
the establishment, operation, and maintenance of FTZs.
5 8  As of
February 1995, over 200 foreign-trade zones operated throughout the
United States, located primarily near port facilities, airports, or
concentrations of manufacturing operations. 9
A. ITZ Befits
Any public or private corporation that imports goods can partici-
pate in the FTZ program and have access to a wide range of potential
Customs savings. Upon entry into a FTZ, foreign merchandise is not
subject to the immediate payment of duties,' to formal entry
procedures,61 or to quota requirements6 2 "unless or until it is
54. 19 U.S.C. §§ 81a-81u (1994).
55. See A.T. Cross Co. v. Sunil Trading Corp., 467 F. Supp. 47, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating
that legislative intent behind creation of FTZ program was to facilitate export from United States
of goods originating in foreign ports without subjecting goods to U.S. taxes upon importation);
Fountain v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 265 F. Supp. 630,633 (E.D. La. 1967) (explaining that
purpose for enacting FIZ program was to encourage and facilitate foreign commerce by
providing areas for storage and reshipment of goods where goods would not be liable for
customs duties).
56. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 103D CONG., IsT SESS., OVERVIEW AND
COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES 48-49 (Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter OVERVIEW].
57. See 19 C.F.R. § 101.3 (1994) (listing current customs regions, districts, and ports of entry
that are foreign-trade zones, and as such are exempt from formal customs entry procedures and
requirements).
58. 19 U.S.C. § 81b (1994). The F1'Z Board shares responsibility for FTTs with the Customs
Service, which is in charge of supervision and enforcement of day-to-day operations. h4 §§ 81b-
81d; see also OVERVIEW, supra note 55, at 49.
59. See FTZ Staff 1994, U.S. Foreign-Trade Zones (Feb. 10, 1995) (on file with The American
Univerity Law Review).
60. See 19 U.S.C. § 81c(a) (1994) (exempting qualified merchandise from U.S. customs laws




19951 JURISDICTIONAL CONSENSUS AND THE CIT 2403
subsequently imported into the U.S. Customs territory."6 3 Generally,
the importer of the merchandise into the FTZ must meet only
minimal paperwork requirements administered by the U.S. Customs
Service' and may hold the merchandise in an FTZ until it is need-
ed,6" thereby benefiting from increased cash flow based on the
deferral of duty payments.' Further, some jurisdictions also allow
the deferment or avoidance of state and local taxes.67
Firms and corporations participating in the FTZ program also save
costs by avoiding duty payments for foreign goods admitted into the
FTZ and subsequently exported.' These goods are not subject to
duties and escape costly duty drawback procedures.69 In addition,
reexported merchandise avoids the application of antidumping and
countervailing duties and is not charged against any applicable import
quotas.7
0
With respect to merchandise imported into the Customs territory
of the United States from the FTZ, corporations operating under FTZ
status can reduce the amount of Customs duty liability owed in several
situations.7' The most important example of such a reduction in
liability is in the case of "inverted tariS."72  Inverted tariffs occur
when the tariff on the finished product entering the U.S. Customs
territory is less than the tariff on the imported components.
63. OVERVIEv, supra note 56, at 49.
64. See 19 C.F.R. § 146.32 (1994) (explaining that requirements for merchandise to be
admitted into zone are filing of application and issuance of permit).
65. See id. §§ 146.51 to .71 (explicating rules for transferring merchandise from foreign-
trade zone).
66. See RobertJ. Heilferty, The Conocro Decision: Exclusive Review of Foreign-Trade Zones
Board Determinations by the U.S. Court of International Trade 2-3 (Nov. 1994) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with TheAmeric.an University LawReview) (discussing potential customs savings
with foreign-trade zones).
67. See 15 C.F.R. § 400.1(c) (1994) (setting forth regulations of FTZ Board with regard to
foreign-trade zones in United States and delineating scope of statute).
68. See 19 U.S.C. § 81c(a) (1994) (outlining rules for handling merchandise in FIZ to
qualify for tariff exemption).
69. I& (providing exemption from duty for certain merchandise shipped into FIZ).
70. See 15 C.F.R. § 400.33(b) (2) (1994) (explaining consequences of application of restric-
tions on admission of items subject to antidumping and countervailing duty orders). Under
normal circumstances, duty drawback is not available for antidumping and countervailing duties.
19 U.S.C. § 1677h (1994).
71. See OVERVIEWv, supra note 56, at 51 (listing inverted tariff, inter alia, as way to reduce
customs duty liability).
72. An inverted tariff results when unfinished components are subject to higher tariffs in
comparison to tariff liability for the final product. Thus, inverted tariffs provide an incentive
to manufacture or assemble components outside the United States. Between 1983 and 1987,
66 of 84 subzone applications (almost 80%) reviewed by the General Accounting Office cited
avoiding inverted tariffs as one reason for applying for subzone status. U.S. GENERAL
AccoUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES PROGRAM NEEDS CLARIFIED
CRITERIA 19 (1989) [hereinafter F Z PROGRAM NEEDS CLARIFIED CRrrERIA].
73. Id.
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Because the FTZ Act permits importers to elect to pay a duty on
either components and raw materials, or on the completed article,v4
importers may reduce their tariff liability by manufacturing or
assembling higher duty components into a lower duty product.
7 5
The ability of U.S. firms to benefit from avoiding these inverted tariffs
enables them to compete against foreign producers that import
finished products at a lower tariff rate." Obviously, the ability of
U.S. industry to compete more readily with foreign producers in this
era of enhanced global competition contributes to the preservation
of not only the U.S. manufacturing and industrial base, but also of
one of its scarcest resources, manufacturing and industrial jobs.7"
B. Categories of FTZs
The FTZ program provides for two categories of FTZs: general-
purpose zones and special-purpose subzones.78 A general-purpose
zone may be granted to any port of entry that satisfies the requisite
criteria.79 The factors that the FTZ Board considers include: (1) the
need for zone services in the port of entry area; (2) the adequacy of
the operational and financial plans and the suitability of the proposed
sites and facilities; (3) the extent of state and local government
support; (4) the views of persons and firms likely to be affected; and
(5) additional criteria relating to public policy and economic effects
if the proposal involves manufacturing and production activity.
80
74. See OVERVIEW, supra note 56, at 51.
75. See OVERVIEW, supra note 56, at 51.
76. See OVERVIEW, supra note 56, at 51 (stating that inverted tariff is responsible for recent
growth of FTZs in high technology as well as production of machinery, electronics, chemicals,
and assembly of high value products). The number of FTZs grew from 7 general-purpose zones
and 3 subzones in 1970 to 138 general purpose zones and 101 subzones in 1987. Id.; see also
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, PUB. No. 2059, THE IMPLICATIONS OF FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES
FOR U.S. INDUSTRIES AND FOR COMPETITwE CONDITIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND FOREIGN FIRMS 1-2
(1988) (explaining that most subzone operations are pursued for advantage of inverted tariff
situations). Statistics compiled by the FIZ Board reflect the magnitude with which U.S. firms
utilize the customs savings of "inverted tariffs" as applied to FTZs. According to the FrZ Board's
1992 Annual Report, 88% of merchandise received in all FTZs was not exported but was
imported for domestic consumption. See 1992 FOREIGN-TRADE ZONES BOARD ANNUAL REPORT
app. D, at 1-3. The advantages for U.S. industry are especially important in industries where
import penetration is high. See HEILFERTY, supra note 66, at 4 (explaining that importer of
merchandise benefits from increased cash flow based on deferral of duty payments).
77. See OVERVIEW, supra note 56, at 51 (explaining that inverted tariff results in increased
manufacturing and industrial production and, therefore, increased manufacturingand industrial
jobs).
78. See 15 C.F.R. § 400.21 (1994) (establishing two categories of FTZs and acceptable
number and location of zones and subzones).
79. See 19 U.S.C. § 81b(b) (1994) (stating that each point of entry shall be entitled to at
least one zone, but where point of entry is located within more than one state it shall have an
additional zone for each state).
80. See 15 C.F.R. § 400.23(a) (1994).
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General-purpose zones are generally administered by public corpora-
tions such as port authorities or local economic development
agencies." Special-purpose subzones are established "to assist
companies which were unable to relocate to or take advantage of an
existing general-purpose zone."8 2 Because only a grantee of an
approved general zone may apply to establish a subzone,s8 each
subzone is technically a subordinate part of the general-purpose zone
with which it is affiliated. 4 Subzones normally include single
manufacturing plants designed for the assembly or manufacture of
imported components into finished goods, and are typically adminis-
tered by individual corporations under an agreement with the
grantee/operator of the general-purpose zone.85
C. FZ Board
Decisions regarding the privilege of participation in the FTZ
program are vested in the FTZ Board and administered by the
Department of Commerce. 6 The members of the FTZ Board
include the Secretaries of the Departments of Commerce, Treasury,
and the Army, or their designated alternates, 7 with the Secretary of
Commerce acting as the FTZ Board's chair.' Generally, the FTZ
Board operates as an inter-agency committee with each member
considering matters based on their jurisdictional responsibilities and
areas of expertise.8" The Department of Commerce is responsible
for economic and industry impact issues;' the Department of the
Treasury oversees the enforcement of Customs laws and the supervi-
sion of zone activity;9 and the Department of the Army, specifically
81. See idL § 81b(b) (authorizing preference to public corporations in grant of general-
purpose zones); see also OVERVIEW, supra note 56, at 49-50 (stating that Port of Houston
Authority administers FIZ for Port of Houston and Miami Free Zone Corp. operates F1rZ at
Miami International Airport).
82. OvERVIEW, supra note 56, at 49-50.
83. See OVERVIEv, supra note 56, at 50.
84. See OVERVIEW, supra note 56, at 50; see also 15 C.F.R. § 400.22(d) (1994) (stating that
zone grantee of closest zone project in same state is eligible for grant of subzone).
85. See HEILFERlY, supra note 66, at 6.
86. See 15 C.F.R. § 400.11 (1994) (articulating authority of FZ Board and giving chairman
of Board, who is also Secretary of Department of Commerce, authority to appoint Executive
Secretary of Board, call meetings of Board, and submit Board's annual report to Congress).
87. See id § 400.2(b).
88. See d (describing scope of Chairperson's authority); id. § 400.11 (b) (defining authority
of Chairman of Frz Board).
89. HEILFERTY, supra note 66, at 5.
90. HEILFERTY, supra note 66, at 5 n.11; see also 15 C.F.R. §§ 400.23, 400.31 (1994)
(establishing FrZ Board criteria for granting zones and subzones).
91. HEILFERTY, supra note 66, at 5 n.11.
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the Army Corps of Engineers, advises the FTZ Board on land use and
environmental matters. 2
The FTZ Board is charged with ensuring that the FTZ program
operates "in the public interest"93 and therefore has the power to
limit or prohibit zone activity that "in its judgment is detrimental to
the public interest."' The FTZ Board must also ensure that the FZ
does not conflict with U.S. trade and tariff policy. 5 In the 1980s,
Congress and the Reagan administration initiated investigations to
examine whether, and under what conditions, the conduct of
manufacturing activity that resulted in the importation of goods under
zone procedures, normally at lower duty rates, was in the "public
interest."96 In response to these investigations and the subsequent
findings, the Department of Commerce in 1991 issued revised
regulations designed to improve the administration of the FTZ
program.97 These revised regulations clarified the requirements for
the establishment and review of FTZ operations and included
authorization to review zone and subzone operations to determine
whether these operations provide a net economic benefit to the
United States.
98
As part of this new emphasis on the benefits of the FTZ program,
the Department of Commerce also developed the so-called "public
interest" test for the establishment and review of zone activity.99 The
"public interest" test was based on both "threshold" factors and
economic factors.100 With regard to the "threshold" factors, the
regulations state:
92. HELFERTY, supra note 66, at 5 n.11.
93. 15 C.F.R. § 400.31(a) (1994).
94. Id. (explaining that determination of public interest is to be made with reference to
factors in 15 C.F.R. § 400.31(b) (1994)); see infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text (reciting
factors enumerated in 15 C.F.R. § 400.31(b)).
95. See 15 C.F.R. § 400.31 (b) (1) (i) (1994) (mandating that FZ Board shall deny or restrict
authority for activity if activity is inconsistent with U.S. trade and tariff law).
96. See generally Operation of the Foreign-Trade Zones Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 174-75 (1989) (arguing that
zone procedures that encourage importation of items that otherwise would be produced and
consumed domestically is major economic incentive); Foreign-Trade Zones: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
101st ong., 1st Sess. 51 (1989) (stating that purpose of FTZ is to expedite and encourage
foreign commerce consistent with public interest); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOREIGN-
TRADE ZONES PROGRAM NEEDS CLARIFIED CRrrERiA 5 (1989) (explaining that subzones are
ancillary sites to be authorized when it can be demonstrated that proposed activity will result in
significant public benefit).
97. See OVERVIEW, supra note 56, at 52 (explaining that revised regulations in 15 C.F.R. §
400.31 (1994) clarify criteria for establishment and review of FrZ).
98. See OvERViEW, supra note 56, at 52.
99. 15 C.F.R. § 400.31 ("[T]he Board shall determine whether the activity is in the public
interest by viewing it in relation to the evaluation criteria. . .
100. See id.
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[The FTZ Board] shall deny or restrict authority for proposed or
ongoing activity if it determines that:
(i) The activity is inconsistent with U.S. trade and tariff law,
or policy which has been formally adopted by the Executive
branch;
(ii) Board approval of the activity under review would
seriously prejudice U.S. tariff and trade negotiations or other
initiatives; or
(iii) The activity involves items subject to quantitative import
controls or inverted tariffs, and the use of zone procedures
would be the direct and sole cause of imports that, but for
such procedures, would not likely otherwise have occurred,
taking into account imports both as individual items and as
components of imported products.'
After reviewing the "threshold" factors, and if further consideration
warrants, the FTZ Board must examine economic factors to determine
"the net economic effect of the activity or proposed activity."" 2 The
eight economic factors include:
(i) Overall employment impact;
(ii) Exports and reexports;
(iii) Retention or creation of manufacturing or processing
activity;
(iv) Extent of value-added activity;
(v) Overall effect on import levels of relevant products,
including import displacement;
(vi) Extent and nature of foreign competition in relevant
products;
(vii) Impact on related domestic industry, taking into account
market conditions; and
(viii) Other relevant information relating to public interest
and net economic impact considerations, including technology
transfers and investment effects. °3
This "public interest" test, together with other regulatory criteria
relating to support from state and local authorities, has been the basis
of much litigation when certain groups oppose efforts by others to
apply for subzone status."°4 Further, opposition to the grant of
subzones has originated from some domestic industries and labor
organizations that are particularly sensitive to imports, such as
101. MI § 400.31(b)(1).
102. hI § 400.31(b)(2).
103. IM.
104. See generally Phibro Energy, Inc. v. Franklin, 822 F. Supp. 759 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993)
(noting that denial of subzone application was due to opposition from local taxing authorities
who were concerned with losing tax revenue).
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automobile parts. ' 5  Moreover, U.S. parts manufacturers have
criticized the FTZ program for reducing their effective tariff protec-
tion.
106
III. JURISDICTION OF THE CIT
In general, the U.S. district courts are vested with civil jurisdiction
over most disputes by virtue of federal question jurisdiction,0 7
diversity jurisdiction, °" or other specific statutory provisions.' 9
The district courts are divested ofjurisdiction, however, if the subject
matter of the action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
CIT. 0 As stated above, the parameters of the CIT's jurisdiction
were redefined in the Customs Courts Act of 1980 to eliminate the
confusion between the jurisdictional mandates of the federal district
courts and the then-named Customs Court."' As the Supreme
Court stated: "Congress intended, first and foremost, to remedy the
confusion over the division ofjurisdiction between the Customs Court
(now the Court of International Trade) and the district courts and to
'ensure ... uniformity in the judicial decisionmaking process."' "'2
Unfortunately, contrary to its intention, Congress effectively created
a "jurisdictional gauntlet for litigants" seeking access to the CIT."'
105. See OVERVIEW, supra note 56, at 50 (stating that domestic industries sensitive to imports
occasionally oppose subzone application); see alsoArmco Steel Corp. v. Stans, 431 F.2d 779, 783-
84 (2d Cir. 1970) (addressing contention whether establishment of shipbuilding subzone with
duty exemption for steel imports harms U.S. steel industry).
106. ' See OvERViEw, supra note 56, at 50 (stating that sharp growth of manufacturing in
subzones has led to increased criticism by parts producers for reducing their tariff protection).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) (stating that U.S. district courts shall have jurisdiction over all
matters arising under laws of United States).
108.. IL § 1332 (stating that U.S. district courts shall have jurisdiction over all controversies
exceedihg $50,000 between citizens of different states, citizen of state and citizen of foreign
state, of foreign citizens as parties to suit).
109. See id. § 1338 (providing for federal jurisdiction over areas of patents, trademarks,
copyrights, and unfair competition).
110. See KMart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 182-83 (1987) (holding that district court
had jurisdiction over dispute relating to "gray market" goods because this area is not one over
which Congress has expressly granted CIT exclusive jurisdiction and that district court had
jurisdiction under both federal question and special jurisdictional provision relating to
trademarks).
111. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (discussing reorganization under Customs
Courts Act of 1980 and identifying elimination ofjurisdictiona confusion as important goal of
reorganization).
112. KMart Corp., 485 U.S. at 188 (quoting COMMrTrEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 20, reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3731).
113. Carman, supra note 22, at 250 (explaining that interpretations ofjurisdiction of CIT
have failed to provide parties with guidance in choosing appropriate forum to seek judicial
relief).
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A. Statutoiy Provisions
The CIT generally functions as a specialized court created to review
administrative actions with respect to trade issues. The specific grant
of exclusive jurisdiction in the CIT is provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (a)-
(h). The provisions provide exclusive jurisdiction for disputes
involving: (1) Customs protests under sections 515 and 516 of the
Tariff Act of 1930;14 (2) antidumping and countervailing duty
proceedings under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1 93 0 ; -n (3)
review of administrative decisions by the Secretary of Labor pertaining
to the granting or denial of "eligibility of workers for adjustment
assistance;"" 6 (4) "final determination[s] of the Secretary of the
Treasury" relating to the Buy American Act;" 7 (5) release of "confi-
dential information;""' (6) customs brokers' licenses;" 9 and (7)
pre-importation rulings by the Secretary of the Treasury.12 If relief
is not available under one of the jurisdictional provisions described
above, a litigant may seek relief under the residual jurisdiction section
set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). It states:
In addition to thejurisdiction conferred upon the Court of Interna-
tional Trade by subsections (a)-(h) of this section and subject to the
exception set forth in subsection (j) of this section [prohibiting
imports of immoral articles], the Court of International Trade shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against
the United States, its agencies, or its officers, that arises out of any
law of the United States providing for-
(1) revenue from imports or tonnage;
(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importa-
tion of merchandise for reasons other than the
raising of revenue;
(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the
importation of merchandise for reasons other
than the protection of the public health or safety;
or
(4) administration and enforcement with respect to
the matters referred to in paragraphs (1)-(3) of
this subsection and subsections (a)-(h) of this
section.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)-(b) (1988).
115. Id. § 1581(c).
116. Id. § 1581(d).
117. Id § 1581(e).
118. Id. § 1581(0.
119. Id. § 1581(g).
120. Id. § 1581(h).
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This subsection shall not confer jurisdiction over an
antidumping or countervailing duty determination which is
reviewable either by the Court of International Trade under
section 516(A) (a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 or by a binational
panel under article 1904 of the United States-Canada Free
Trade Agreement and section 516A(g) of the Tariff Act of
1930.121
This section marks the heart of the confusion over the scope of the
CIT's exclusive jurisdiction. The legislative history of the residual
jurisdiction section shows that Congress intended to broaden the
exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT in order to eliminate the confusion
over the jurisdictional boundaries between th6 district courts and the
cIT.
22
The specific grants of exclusive jurisdiction together with the
residual jurisdiction section do not encompass every suit against the
United States challenging trade-related laws and regulations, such as
laws regulating export activity or laws restricting imports of specific
products." To the contrary, if "Congress had wished to do so it
could have expressed an intent much more clearly and simply by, for
example, conveying to the specialized court 'exclusivejurisdiction...
over all civil actions against the [Government] directly affecting
imports'"524 or other more expansive language. The absence of a
clear demarcation as to the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT through
the use of this language created the historic jurisdictional uncertainty.
B. Interpretation of the Residual Jurisdiction Section
In order to bring a claim to the CIT, plaintiffs must first determine
whether the subject matter falls within either the seven specific
121. Id. § 1581(i).
122. &e COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 22, at 33, repinted in 1980 U.SC.CAN. at 3745.
This legislative history described the section as
granting broad residual jurisdiction to the Court of International Trade. This section
granted the court jurisdiction over those civil actions which arise directly out of an
import transaction and involve one of the many international trade laws. The purpose
of this section was to eliminate the confusion which currently exists as to the
demarcation between the jurisdiction of the federal district courts and the Court of
International Trade. This language made it clear that all suits of this type are properly
commenced only in the Court of International Trade and not in a district court.
Id, According to the House Report, subsection (i) is designed to "expand thejurisdiction of the
Court of International Trade" but is "intended only to confer subject matterjurisdiction upon
the court, and not to create any new causes of action not founded on other provisions of law."
Id. at 47-49, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3758-60.
123. &me7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1988); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401 (1988).
124. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 188 (1987) (quoting S. 2857, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978)). The Court explained that by rejecting this approach, Congress opted for a
scheme that achieved goals of uniformity and clarity by delineating customs-related matters over
which CIT would have exclusive jurisdiction. Id.
2410
JURISDICTIONAL CONSENSUS AND THE CIT
provisions of the CIT's exclusive jurisdiction or the CIT's residual
jurisdiction provision." If so, they must use the applicable jurisdic-
tional pathway for administrative and judicial relief expressed in the
relevant statute for that particular provision.1 26 In most cases, if
plaintiffs fail to fit the case within one of these "eight jurisdictional
fingers," relief in the CIT will not be available.'12 This includes
those, cases where the plaintiff could have sought relief under one of
the specific jurisdictional provisions but instead filed under the
residual jurisdiction provision.
28
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit narrowed the reach
of the residual jurisdiction by creating a new jurisdictional stan-
dard." In order to proceed under the residual jurisdiction provi-
sion, the plaintiff had the burden to show that the remedy available
under one of the specific provisions would be "manifestly inade-
quate.""s Further interpretations by the courts have reiterated the
belief that the residual jurisdiction section would not be available to
create "new causes of action not founded on other provisions of
existing law"' 3 and was instead created "to reflect existing law and
not to expand the Court of International Trade jurisdiction."13 2 As
Judge Carman has commented: '
The narrow interpretation given to [section] 1581(i) by the courts
has contributed to the effect of requiring individuals and firms that
have real international trade and customs law grievances to expend
125. See United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 687 F.2d 467, 472 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (denyingjudicial
review of Customs "internal advice" ruling because plaintiff could have properly invoked CIT's
jurisdiction had appropriate Customs protest procedures been followed); Miller & Co. v. United
States, 824 F.2d 961, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that CITjurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1581(i) may not be invoked when jurisdiction under another provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1581 is
available, unless remedy under provision is clearly inadequate), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1041 (1988).
126. See Miller, 824 F.2d at 964 (upholding dismissal of complaint relating to administrative
review of countervailing duty because plaintiff failed to follow appropriate jurisdictional
pathway).
127. See Carman, supra note 22, at 250 (explaining that subject matter jurisdiction of CIT is
limited to eight enumerated categories).
128. See Uniroyal, 687 F.2d at 472 (ruling that CIT did not have jurisdiction under residual
provision, § 1581(i) because plaintiff could have filed protest pursuant to statutory scheme of
§ 1581(a)); see also Carman, supra note 22, at 251 (explaining that jurisdiction under § 1581(i)
is not available ifjurisdiction is available under other provisions of § 1581).
129. See Carman, supra note 22, at 252 (contending that "manifestly inadequate" standard
articulated in Miller added new "judicially-required prerequisite" absent from statute or
legislative history); see also infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
130. See Miller, 824 F.2d at 963; Uniroyal, 687 F.2d at 472; Carman, supra note 22, at 252
(clarifying standard that plaintiff must meet when remedy is available under other provisions of
§ 1581).
131. See Carman, supra note 22, at 252 (quoting National Corn Growers Ass'n v. Baker, 840
F.2d 1547, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that CIT lacked jurisdiction over dispute regarding
Customs Court ruling because plaintiff failed to file protest with Customs Court as is
procedurally required before appeal may be taken)).
182. See Carman, supra note 22, at 252 (quoting National Corn Growers, 840 F.2d at 1556).
1995] 2411
THE AMERICAN UNlVERSrlY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:2393
significant amounts of time and money in sometimes futile efforts
to obtain judicial review on the merits of the case)"
Moreover, Judge Carman stated that both the statutory scheme itself
and the narrow interpretations of the residual jurisdiction provision
have "resulted in limiting access by, litigants to resolve legitimate cases
and controversies pertaining to customs and international trade
cases."13
4
IV. REDEFINITION OF THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE CIT
The confusion over whether the CIT or federal district court is the
appropriate forum for resolving relevant trade disputes originates
from both the statutory language and the narrow judicial interpreta-
tions of this language.3 Given the static state of the CIT's statutory
jurisdictional grant," any attempt to ameliorate the jurisdictional
confusion must come from a consistent mandate from both the CIT
and the district courts. In the area of FTZs, these courts have taken
a significant step toward clarifying the jurisdictional demarcation.
A. Judicial Review of FTZ Board Decisions
Aside from decisions to revoke zone status,3 7 the FTZ Act does
not specify which court hasjurisdiction to review FTZ Board decisions.
As stated earlier, either the CIT or federal district court will review
FTZ Board decisions depending on the nature of the dispute."s
Although the Customs Courts Act of 1980 was intended to delineate
the jurisdictional boundaries, it did not clarify where a FTZ case, or
any other case, was to be properly heard.
The only explicit provision for judicial review of FTZ decisions
applies to orders revoking the grant of an FTZ.' 9 This provision
permits the grantee to appeal such a revocation to the court of
133. See Carman, supra note 22, at 252.
134. See Carman, supra note 22, at 252.
135. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)-(i) (1988) (governing subject matter jurisdiction of CIT).
136. Congress made minor changes to the foreign-trade zones program in the implementing
legislation for the North American Free Trade Agreement. See North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2091 (1993) (codified in 19
U.S.C. § 3301 note).
137. 19 U.S.C. § 81r(c) (1994) (stating that order revoking grant shall be final and
conclusive unless grantee appeals to court of appeals for circuit in which zone is located within
90 days).
138. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)-(i) (providing exclusive jurisdiction to CIT over certain
disputes); see also supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text (discussing explicitly enumerated
areas over which CIT has exclusive jurisdiction).
139. 19 U.S.C. § 81r(c) (providing appellate procedures for grantee whose FTZ grant has
been revoked).
2412
1995] JURISDICTIONAL CONSENSUS AND THE CIT 2413
appeals for the circuit in which the zone is located.1" Prior to
1980, this limited guidance did not present a problem because court
action relating to FTZ Board determinations was rare. In fact, only
one court case specifically addressed a FTZ Board decision prior to
1980.41 In the 1980s, the expansion- of the FTZ program'4 neces-
sarily increased the probability that FTZ Board decisions would result
in increased judicial examination. In the CIT, the first case to review
a FTZ Board determination was Conoco, Inc. v. United States Foreign-
Trade Zones Board." The Conoco case and its judicial history
represent the key initial step toward defining the exclusive jurisdiction
of the CIT.'
B. Conoco, Inc, v. United States Foreign-Trade Zones Board
In Conoco, the FTZ Board approved subzone applications filed by
the Lake Charles Harbor and Terminal District (District)."1 The
District operated an FTZ in Lake Charles, Louisiana, and it filed
subzone applications for Conoco, Inc. and Citgo Petroleum Corp. for
their crude oil refineries adjacent to the Port of Lake Charles.1" In
approving the applications, the FTZ Board imposed certain conditions
on the applicants, including a requirement that they pay duties on
imported crude oil or refined products used as fuel.147 Also, the
FTZ Board eliminated the inverted tariff benefits.'"
140. Id. (stating that grantee must file petition with appropriate court of appeals praying that
order of FrPZ Board be set aside).
141. See Armco Steel Corp. v. Stans, 303 F. Supp. 262, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'&d 431 F.2d
779, 781, 790 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that FIZ Board order granting subzone to shipyard was
not improper although it permitted construction of vessels with duty-free foreign steel and area
would be used solely by private corporation).
142. See FIZ PROGRAM NEEDS CLARIFIED CRITERIA, supra note 72, at 13 (stating that
"authorized general purpose zones increased from 17 to 138 while subzones increased from 2
to 101 between fiscal years 1975-87").
143. 790 F. Supp. 279 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992), rev'd 18 F.3d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
144. See Conoco, Inc. v. United States Foreign-Trade Zones Bd., 790 F. Supp. 279, 282 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1992) (holding that CIT lackedjurisdiction over action by oil companies challenging
conditions placed on grants of FTZ), rev'd, 18 F.3d 1581, 1590 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that
CIT does have jurisdiction to review FFZ Board's imposition of conditions of foreign trade
subzones).
145. Conoco, 790 F. Supp. at 280.
146. M.
147. Id.
148. See Resolution and Order Approving the Application of the Lake Charles Harbor and
Terminal District for a Subzone at the Conoco, Inc., Refinery in Calcasieu Parish, LA, 53 Fed.
Reg. 52,455 (1988); Resolution and Order Approving the Application of the Lake Charles
Harbor and Terminal District for a Subzone at the Citgo Petroleum Corp. Refinery in Calcasieu
Parish, LA, 54 Fed. Reg. 27,660 (1989), cited in Conoco, 790 F. Supp. at 280-81.
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1. District Court
In response to the FTZ Board's decision, Conoco and Citgo filed
an action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana." In January 1990, the district court dismissed the suit
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and found that although the
residual jurisdiction provision of the CIT did not create any substan-
tive rights, the provision should be applicable to the case whether or
not an actual tariff on foreign commerce was presently being
imposed.'O
2. Court of International Trade
Later that year, Conoco and Citgo refiled their claims in the CIT
asserting that the conditions imposed by the FTZ Board were
discriminatory, unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, in excess of
statutory authority, and an abuse of discretion.' In this action,
Conoco and Citgo asserted that the CIT had exclusive jurisdiction
over this dispute by virtue of the residual provisions of § 1581 (i). 52
The Government responded that no court had jurisdiction to review
the actions of the FTZ Board in this instance or, in the alternative,
that the possible jurisdictional paths otherwise available are inapplica-
ble to the case because the M Board's actions failed to meet the
prerequisites for subject matter jurisdiction.5
To support its argument that no court had jurisdiction to review
FTZ Board actions, the Government contended that Congress only
intended for the CIT to review revocations of zone or subzone
status-as explicitly provided in the statute-and did not provide for
review of FTZ Board actions similar to those involved in the Conoco
case."M Claiming that the plaintiffs had not utilized the appropriate
jurisdictional path, the Government argued that the plaintiffs had not
followed the Customs protest procedures. 5 5 As discussed previous-
ly,15 the CIT has required that when another remedy was, or could
have been, available under one of the CIT's other jurisdictional
149. Conoco, 790 F. Supp. at 280.
150. Id
151. IM at 279.
152. 1& at 281.
153. ML
154. Id.
155. See id. at 287-88 (noting that Government supported position that plaintiffs failed to
take advantage of Customs protest procedures by pointing out that Citgo had used its subzone
and paid duties on fuel consumed in subzone).
156. See supra notes 125-84 and accompanying text.
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provisions, the party seeking to assert the residual provision had the
burden to meet the threshold requirement of showing that the
remedy would be "'manifestly inadequate.'" '57
The CIT held that the plaintiffs failed to follow the necessary
prerequisites under the other available provisions providing exclusive
jurisdiction and failed to demonstrate that availing themselves of
another provision was "manifestly inadequate.""ss Thus, the CIT
concluded that the action was premature under § 1581 (a) and
barred under § 1581(i) . The CIT did not address the argument
advanced by the Government that no court had jurisdiction to review
this particular case.
161
Although the CIT ruled against the plaintiffs, Judge Carman
substantially addressed, in dicta, the jurisdictional problems facing
litigants in trade cases such as Conoco."62 He stated:
Merely because a court perceives what it believes might be a wrong
does not give the court the power to right the perceived wrong.
This Court is powerless to act where its jurisdiction has not been
properly invoked. Our appellate court has held, and we are bound
to follow the rule, that subsection (i) cannot generally be used to
bypass administrative review where there is an opportunity for
meaningful protest.
This Court feels compelled to express its sense of exasperation and
frustration with the results of this case. Individuals and firms are
often required to expend an inordinate amount of time and money
to obtain judicial review in this Court. They are required to
navigate arcane jurisdictional passages. They waste time and
resources fighting over jurisdiction and oftentimes they are denied
157. Conoco, 790 F. Supp. at 284 (quoting Miller & Co. v. United States, 824 F.2d 961, 963
(Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. den/ieA 484 U.S. 1041 (1988)).
158. XL at 285; see also National Corn Growers Ass'n v. Baker, 840 F.2d 1547, 1556-57 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) was not intended to circumvent process of
administrative protest); United States v. Uniroyal, 687 F.2d 467, 472 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (same).
159. See Conoco, 790 F. Supp. at 285 (holding that § 1581(a) is not available to assert
jurisdiction for review of Customs protest and subsequent denial because plaintiffs did not await
assessments and liquidations by Customs and did not file protest that resulted in whole or in
part in denial of relief).
160. I. at 288. The court held that plaintiffs could not assertjurisdiction under the residual
jurisdictional provision, § 1581(i), because they had not "articulated any persuasive reason why
waiting to bring an action under § 1581(a) would be a manifestly inadequate remedy or that
there is some threat of immediate injury or irreparable harm to an industry." Id.
161. See Conoco, Inc. v. United States Foreign-Trade Zones Bd., 18 F.3d 1581, 1584 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (rejecting Government's argument on appeal that court need not review
Government's contention in court below that conditions placed on grant by FIZ Board were
unreviewable by any court, even though lower court did not reach that issue), revu790 F. Supp.
279 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992).
162. See Conco, 790 F. Supp. at 288-89.
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a chance to be heard on the merits of the case. These obstacles
unnecessarily increase cost and hurt the efforts of the United States
to be competitive in the international community."e
After describing the jurisdictional conflict between the CIT and the
district courts and the use of the conflict by the Government to
circumvent the review of Board actions, Judge Carman stated that:
The instant case is another example of this kind of jurisdictional
ping-pong that continues to subsist. It must be brought under
control.
Congress needs to re-examine how to implement the broad jurisdic-
tional mandate it sought to confer upon the Court of International
Trade with the enactment of § 1581 (i) to ensure compliance with
the constitutional mandate requiring uniformity of duties through-
out the United States.164
3. Federal Circuit
In response to the CIT's decision, the plaintiffs appealed in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit" The
Federal Circuit first addressed the issue of whether any court had
jurisdiction to review the FTZ Board's actions." On this issue, the
Federal Circuit stated that "judicial review of agency action is to be
presumed, absent clear and convincing evidence of congressional
intent to the contrary." 7 The Federal Circuit found that the
absence of language in the statute did not amount to clear and
convincing evidence for the requisite congressional intention that the
FTZ Board's actions are barred from review."6 The Federal Circuit
then held that orders of the FTZ Board, regardless of the issue
involved, are "generally subject to judicial review in accordance with
established principles of law.""69
Next, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of which forum was
appropriate for reviewing the FTZ Board's actions.' Following a
discussion of the congressional intent surrounding the jurisdiction
issue,'7 ' the court concluded that if jurisdiction resides under the
163. Id.
164. Id. at 289.
165. Conoco, 18 F.3d at 1582.
166. Id at 1584.
167. Id. at 1585.
168. 1&L
169. Id.
170. ML at 1586.
171. Id. Quoting from the legislative history behind the enactment of § 1581(i), the court
reiterated that the purpose of the residual jurisdictional provision was to eliminate confusion
over the jurisdictional demarcation between the district courts and the CT, to eliminate the
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provisions of § 1581, the CIT would have sole responsibility for
judicial review of the substantive issues appellant raises.172 If no
grant ofjurisdiction can be found, the district courts may invoke their
general administrative review function. 73 The court stated:
Congress had in mind consolidating this area of administrative law
in one place, and giving to the Court of International Trade, with
an already developed expertise in international trade and tariff
matters, the opportunity to bring to it a degree of uniformity and
consistency. Obviously that would not be possible if jurisdiction
were spread among the district courts throughout the land. 174
In determining whether the CIT had exclusive jurisdiction, the
Federal Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs were not required to
proceed with a Customs protest under § 1581 (a) because Customs did
not have authority to review, reverse, or modify FTZ Board actions in
a Customs protest proceeding.75 Thus, the court held that "subsec-
tion (a) is not intended to provide an effective jurisdictional
vehicle." 71 In rendering this conclusion, the court relied on both
case law77 and legislative history.7
Finally, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether the
residual jurisdictional provision, § 1581 (i), applied in this in-
difficulties that this confusion caused for trade litigants, and to ensure that this type of suit was





175. I. at 1587. In essence, the court found that relief under Customs protest proceedings
would be manifestly inadequate because the protest proceedings do not apply to the actions of
a separate agency, the FIZ Board, which is not under the jurisdiction of the Treasury
Department. Id. The court also detailed the extensive steps that Conoco and Citgo would be
required to undertake to effectuate a Customs protest. The protest would require:
Conoco and Citgo to activate their respective subzones, import crude oil therein, have
Customs assess duties on that oil, pay those duties, file a protest with Customs, and
then await the decision of Customs to deny the protest-all before filing suit to
challenge the conditions the FIZ Board imposed on the grant of the subzone.
IM at 1584.
176. Id at 1587.
177. Id at 1587-88. The court discussed Luggage & Leather Goods Mfrs. of Am. v. United
States, 588. F. Supp. 1413, 1420-22 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) (holding that CIT could exercise
jurisdiction under § 1581(i) for challenge to presidential order designating certain articles
eligible for duty-free treatment because requiring initial recourse under other jurisdictional
provisions would have been "futile and inappropriate") and United States Sugar Refiners' Ass'n
v. Block, 544 F. Supp. 883, 887 (Ct. Int'l Trade) (holding that CIT could exercise jurisdiction
under § 1581(i) for challenge to presidential proclamation imposing import quotas on sugar
because requiring initial recourse to otherjurisdictional provisions would have been "inequitable
and an insistence of a useless formality"), af'd, 683 F.2d 399 (C.C.PA. 1982). See Conoco, 18 F.3d
at 1587-88.
178. Id at 1588 (noting that Congress removed language in § 1581(a) in response to
concerns that litigants may use section to collaterally attack Customs' actions).
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stance."' First, the Federal Circuit declared that, based on a
straightforward reading, the sweep of subsection (i) appeared to cover
the issues that the appellants raised.1s According to the court, the
FTZ program arose under laws designed to deal with revenue from
imports, and the purpose of the program was to provide special rules
for determining and assessing duty rates for merchandise imported
into these zones.18 Thus, the FTZ action would fall squarely under
subsection (i) (1), which covered civil actions arising out of any law of
the United States providing "'for revenues from imports or ton-
nage.' 18 2  Second, the court distinguished the facts in Conoco from
the cases cited by the Government."t Third, the court found that
relief under another jurisdictional provision, subsection (h), was
"manifestly inadequate" for the same reasons that relief under
subsection (a) was inadequate-because it provided relief from an
action by the Department of Treasury, the provision would not
provide effective review of an action of the FTZ Board because it was




182. See id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(1) (1988)).
183. Id. at 1588-89. In K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the term
.embargoes" used in § 1581(i)(3) did not give the CIT jurisdiction over certain gray-market
goods. As described by the Supreme Court, "[a] 'gray market' good is a foreign-manufactured
good bearing a valid United States trademark, which is imported without the consent of the
United States trademark owner." Id. at 179. The Court viewed the case as essentially private
enforcement on behalf of trademark owners. Id. The Court found that the CIT'sjurisdictional
lines were narrowly drawn and that the CIT did not have any "specialized expertise" in general
trademark law. Id. at 189. The Conoco court distinguished K Mart Corp. by stating that:
[Tihere can be no question that we are here dealing with issues of governmental law
and policy regarding customs and tariffs, the type of issues with which the Court of
International Trade is acknowledged to have expertise.... [W e have no difficulty
finding within the parameters of subsection (i) the precise terms needed to cover the
issues here.
Conoco, 18 F.3d at 1589. The Federal Circuit also distinguished National Corngrowers Ass'n v.
Baker, 840 F.2d 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1988), a case in which it ruled against a producer who argued
that relief under § 1581(i) (b) was manifestly inadequate because the decision under review in
National Corn Growers was one that Customs had the authority to correct. Conoco, 18 F.3d at
1589. The remaining cases cited by the Government were distinguished because relief could be
found under other subsections of§ 1581. See id. (distinguishing Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v.
United States, 963 F.2d 356, 360 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (involving Customs protest proceeding that
could have been challenged under subsection (b)); Miller & Co. v. United States, 824 F.2d 961,
964 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (focusing on administrative review of countervailing duty order where
plaintiff could have invoked subsection (c)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1041 (1988); American Air
Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States, 718 F.2d 1546, 1550-51 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (appealing
Customs protest proceedingwhere subsection (a) was available), cert. denie,! 466 U.S. 937 (1984);
United States v. Uniroyal, 687 F.2d 467, 472 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (involving protest proceeding
followed by judicial review under subsection (a)).
184. Conoco, 18 F.3d at 1590.
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Thus, the court held that the CIT erred by not exercising jurisdic-
tion under § 1581 (i) because the protest procedure under § 1581 (a)
was "manifestly inadequate" and because the action was explicitly
covered under § 1581 (i) (1).'" The court further stated that it was
time to end the "unproductive jurisdictional ping-pong games," and
instead to provide litigants with the right to expeditious and timely
decisions on the merits.'8
The Federal Circuit then remanded the case back to the CIT for an
adjudication on the merits. 7 The CIT subsequently remanded the
case to the FTZ Board to explain more fully the rationale underlying
its decision to condition the subzone grant, including an explanation
as to how the conditions imposed on Conoco's and Citgo's subzone
grants were intended to serve the public interest."
C. Miami Free Zone Corp. v. Foreign Trade Zones Board
Notwithstanding the Conoco decision, the move toward consistent
application of the CIT's jurisdictional mandate in FTZ cases was still
contingent on the response of the district courts and their appellate
courts. This response was critical because the receptiveness of the
CIT to exercising exclusive jurisdiction in FTZ cases would be
undermined if district courts did not deny jurisdiction in relevant
cases. In Miami Free Zone Corp. v. Foreign Trade Zones Board, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit followed Conoco
and held that the residual jurisdiction provision was sufficiently broad
to cover FTZ Board determinations.
18 9
185. Id.
186. IM/ In Phibro Energy, Inc. v. Franklin, the CIT held that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to review the case based on similar grounds as to the CIT's holding in Conoco. 822
F. Supp. 759, 765-66 (C. Int'l Trade 1993), rev'd sub nom. without op., Phibro Energy, Inc. v.
Brown, 33 F.3d 65 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In Phibro, the Port of Houston Authority applied for special-
purpose subzone status on behalf of Phibro Energy, Inc. for two petroleum refineries in
Houston and Texas City. Id. at 759. In response to opposition from local taxing authority based
on lost revenue, the FrZ Board denied the application. Id. at 760. In response to Phibro's
appeal to the CIT, the court concluded that it lacked subject matterjurisdiction for two reasons:
(1) the statutory guidelines underlying the FIZ Board's decision did not correspond to
§ 1581(i); and (2) the CT's authority under § 1581(i) relates only to imports whereas the FrZ
program "seeks to facilitate export transactions." Id. at 763-64. Judge Carman again expressed
his concern over the "jurisdictional ping-pong" existing in these cases and advocated a re-
examination of the CIT'sjurisdictional mandate. Id. at 765. On appeal to the Federal Circuit,
the Phibro case was remanded to the CIT based on the Federal Circuit's decision in Conoco. See
Phibro Energy, Inc. v. Brown, 33 F.3d 65 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
187. Id.
188. Conoco, Inc. v. United States Foreign-Trade Zones Bd., 855 F. Supp. 1306, 1312-13 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1994).
189. Miami Free Zone Corp. v. Foreign Trade Zones Bd., 22 F.3d 1110, 1112-13 (D.C. Cir.
1994), affg 803 F. Supp. 442 (D.D.C. 1992).
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The plaintiff in Miami Free Zone Corp., Wynwood Community
Economic Development Corporation (Wynwood), filed for an
additional foreign-trade zone in the Miami area.' 9 Miami Free
Zone Corp. already operated a general-purpose foreign-trade zone at
Miami International Airport, and Wynwood Was seeking zone status
at the Port of Miami to service ocean shippers not served by the
airport location.'9' The FTZ Board approved Wynwood's application,
and the Miami Free Zone Corp. filed an action in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia under the Administrative Proce-
dures Act (APA) to challenge the FTZ Board's approval of Wynwood's
application-in effect attempting to prevent any decrease in com-
merce through the only FTZ in the area. 92 The plaintiffs argued
that section 701 of the APA provides jurisdiction in district court for
persons wronged by agency action, unless review is precluded by
statute. 93 The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and held that the CIT had exclusive jurisdiction
under the residual provision, § 1581 (i).194 Thus, the district court
found that the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT relieved the district
court from ruling on APA challenges to agency actions pursuant to its
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331."95
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit found that § 1581 (i) (1)-(2) would not provide a basis for
exclusive jurisdiction because these provisions related to laws
providing for revenue from imports or for "'tariffs, duties, fees, or
other taxes on the importation of merchandise for reasons other than
raising of revenue. '""'96 Conversely, the FTZ program created
exemptions from the collection of revenues or tariffs imposed by
other statutes. 9 7 The D.C. Circuit, however, held that § 1581 (i) (4),
which relates to laws providing for "'administration and enforcement
with respect to matters referred to in paragraph (1)-(3) of this subsec-
tion,"'198 was sufficiently expansive ancd "seem[ed] to sweep more
broadly and literally to encompass statutes, such as the Foreign-Trade
190. Id. at 1111.
191. Id
192. Miami Free Zone Corp. v. Foreign Trade Zones Bd., 803 F. Supp. 442, 442-43 (D.D.C.
1992) (stating that plaintiff filed suit under APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, seeking remedy against
administrative action that is arbitrary and capricious or otherwise abuse of discretion under
applicable statutory language), aJJ'd, 22 F.3d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
193. I& at 443.
194. Id. at 444.
195. Miami Free Zone Corp., 22 F.3d at 1111-12.
196. See id at 1112 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(2) (1988)).
197. I&
198. Id (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (4) (1988)).
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Zones Act, that contemplate[d] relaxation of tariffs and duties in
order to achieve non-revenue goals such as the promotion of
international commerce."'9 The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that
the issue raised was "a close one,"2° but, emphasizing the value of
uniformity in judicial review, the court ruled consistently with the
Federal Circuit in Conoco and held that the CIT had exclusive
jurisdiction. °'
Both Conoco and Miami Free Zone Corp. resulted in an expansion of
the CIT's exclusive jurisdiction in the FTZ arena. More importantly,
these decisions may represent the beginning of the end to the
confusing demarcation over the jurisdiction in FTZ cases between the
CIT and the district courts.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CIT's JURISDICTIONAL EVOLUTION
Given the recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, it would seem that the CIT has acquired
important and exclusivejurisdiction regarding 1TZ issues. As a result,
FTZs have been added to the list of international trade issues
committed to CIT jurisdiction for purposes of review of decisions
made by domestic administrative agencies.2 2  Thus, the Federal
Circuit has consolidated CIT jurisdiction as Congress had intend-
ed.2°3  The result of greater specialization for consideration of
international trade issues, however, has both positive and negative
implications.
A. Positive Implications
As previously discussed in the World Trade Organization context,
international trade issues often involve competing interests: promot-
ing uniformity versus accommodating local needs.2  In the case of
specialized federal courts, uniformity is often desirable as a function
of eliminating multiple, and potentially inconsistent, review among
the various judicial circuits.05 Independent circuit decisions are
199. Ia. at 1112-13.
200. Id. at 1112.
201. Id. at 1113.
202. See i/. (reviewing decisions of Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and holding that
CIT has exclusive jurisdiction regarding FM'Zs).
203. See Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-417, 94 Star. 1727, 1728-30 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (detailing jurisdiction of CIT); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581 (1988) (specifying CIT subject matterjurisdiction).
204. See supra notes 7-18 and accompanying text (discussing concerns regarding balancing
of local interests with desire for uniformity under WTO).
205. See Revesz, supra note 29, at 1116 (explaining that supporters ofjudicial specialization
believe that specialized courts will promote uniformity of decisions by eliminating review in
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especially troubling in the realm of international trade law, which is,
in essence, an expression of national policy and leads to inconsistent
stare decisis and forum shopping.21 With respect to accommodat-
ing local needs in the context of FTZ policy, it seems clear that the
use of an FTZ structure was designed to enhance the ability of
localized industry to gain benefits from participation in export
promotion activities and from improved access to imported materials.
As a result, trade policy would appear to have benefitted from
uniform applications. For example, forty U.S. Governors recently
wrote the following to President Clinton:
Moreover, as Governors, each of us has a vital obligation to create
well-paying jobs for the citizens of our states. Indeed, our commit-
ment to our states' economic prosperity is the primary reason each
of us was elected to office. International trade has an increasingly
large impact on our states' economic vitality, as witnessed by the
rapid growth in exports over the past several years." 7
Central to realizing a principled and effective approach to the
liberalization of international trade is a system of trade law that is
uniform throughout the United States itself. Commenting on the
need for uniformity, one economist stated that economic progress
combined with the uniformity of laws facilitated the importance of
inter-regional trade in the United States. 208 Thus, GATT's princi-
ples of discouraging discriminatory trading rules among member
nations holds the same importance as uniform laws within the United
States-preventing individual states from imposing individual barri-
ers.2 °1 Only with such uniformity can the international trading
system realize the same benefits that contributed to the U.S. emer-
gence as a world economic leader.21°
multiple circuits where intercircuit stare decisis is absent).
206. See id. at 1116-17 (explaining that lack of uniformity results from absence ofintercircuit
stare decisis, which in turn leads to forum shopping); see also Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal
Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6-25 (1989) (reviewing benefits of
establishing Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit); Hon. Randall R. Rader, Specialized Courts:
The Legislative Response, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1003, 1006-09 (1991) (citing legislative history of
Federal Circuit establishment, including statement by Sen. Strom Thurmond that, "[t]he
creation of this appellate structure will eventually lead to uniformity in this very important and
specialized field of law").
207. Letter from the Hon. Mike Lowry, Governor of Washington et al., to the Hon. William
J. Clinton, President of the United States 1 (Aug. 4, 1994) (on file with The American University
Law Review) (supporting legislation to implement the Uruguay Round of GATT).
208. JOE COBB, HERITAGE FOUNDATION MEMORANDUM, THE ISSUE OF U.S. SOVEREIGNTY
UNDER THE NEW GATT AGREEMENT 4 (Apr. 13, 1994) (crediting Interstate Commerce Clause
of U.S. Constitution as direct cause of rise of U.S. economic dominance in 20th century).
209. Id.
210. Id. In Joe Cobb's own words:
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By strengthening the jurisdiction of the CIT, the uniformity by
which trade law is applied is also strengthened in several ways:
precision, coherence, and accuracy. First, centralization of trade cases
in the CIT enhances the precision of judicial review.21' This means
that courts dealing with the same subject matter will reach the same
decisions so that "horizontal equity" is achieved. 212  Without suffi-
cient precision, the result can, and will, be forum shopping for relief
consistent with the economic self-interest of the appellant.213  For
example, in patent law, significant distortions arose before the
establishment of a specialized appeal procedure for patent claims,
such as when a patent was four times as likely to be held valid in the
Seventh Circuit than in the Second Circuit.
214
The interest in avoiding forum shopping on trade issues is equally
compelling. Some have argued that uniformity in Customs issues
arises directly from the constitutional command that "all Duties,
Imposts, and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States."
2 15
Aside from mere precision, it is likely that the results of an
enhanced role for the CIT will improve the coherence of trade
decisionmaking.2 6 Coherence in this context means that decisions
As important to the United States' economic progress as free trade was the uniform
rule of law that made inter-regional trade possible. Similarly, GATT's most important
benefit has been to discourage trade practices by its member governments that
discriminate against foreign producers .... The United States could never have
realized its potential for world economic leadership if the individual States had been
allowed to impose the barriers that already were beginning to appear in 1787.
Id.
211. See Dreyfuss, supra note 206, at 8 (defining precision, when applied in patent law
context, as "[t]he extent to which the law produces horizontal equity").
212. See Dreyfuss, supra note 206, at 8 (explaining that best measure of precision is "whether
two courts deciding the same case reach the same result").
213. See Revesz, supra note 29, at 1116-17 (explaining that lack of uniformity among circuits
could produce rampant forum shopping); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 206, at 7 (citing
conditions in patent context in which "forum shopping was rampant").
214. See Dreyfuss, supra note 206, at 7 (indicating that from 1945 to 1957, patents were more
likely to be held valid in Fifth Circuit than in Seventh Circuit, and more likely to be held valid
in Seventh Circuit than in Second Circuit).
215. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 2; see Revesz, supra note 29, at 1117 (indicating that one
commentator has argued that enhanced need for uniformity flows from constitutional dictate
(citing Paul P. Rao, 40 BROOK. L REV. 581, 585 (1974)); see also OVERVIEw, supra note 56, at v
(stating that House Ways and Means Committee views Article I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution as
establishing "the role of Congress in formulating international economic policy and regulating
international trade"); Paul P. Rao, A Pimer on Customs Court Practice, 40 BROOK. L. REV. 581, 585
(1974) (indicating that Congress created Board of General Appraisers in Tariff Act of 1890 in
order to establish uniformity in customs law and comply with constitutional dictates). Judge
Carman of the CIT likewise has underscored the constitutional importance of national trade
policy. SeeCarman, supra note 22, at 246 (mentioning constitutional requirement that all duties,
imports, and excises be uniform throughout United States).
216. Cf Dreyfuss, supra note 206, at 66-67 (discussing lack of coherence in patent law prior
to creation of Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit).
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are not only consistently applied, but that they spring from a common
conception of the statutory scheme that underlies the dispute.2 ' In
the absence of the CIT, the only institution that could potentially
bring coherence to trade law would be the U.S. Supreme Court, but
infrequent review by the Supreme Court undermines its capacity in
this regard.21 In addition, depending on the FTZ Board itself to
produce a uniform vision may be problematic because the FTZ Board
is not engaged in an adversarial proceeding; the party establishing the
lionshare of the record and actually appearing before the FTZ
Board-the zone applicant-seeks a lenient interpretation of the
criteria for granting an FTZ and the standards under which FTZs are
governed.
Both precision and coherence deal with the capacity of the CIT to
replicate decisions in a uniform fashion. Centralizing international
trade decisions within the CIT also fosters development of expertise
at the CIT, thereby enhancing the accuracy of the actual decisions.219
It has long been observed that the growing complexity of the issues
before courts confounds the generalist underpinnings of the judicial
system.22 ° Judge Friendly has written that complex issues are often
"quite beyond the ability of the usual judge to understand without the
expenditure of an inordinate amount of educational effort by counsel
and of attempted self-education by the judge, and in many instances,
even with it."
22 '
Even if the facts presented in the review of an FTZ determination
are relatively simple-a balance of equities between public and
corporate interest-the specific policy objective that underlies the
foreign trade law may create a complex set of competing interests that
requires specialized expertise for accurate decisionmaking.222 Both
217. See Revesz, supra note 29, at 1117 (explaining that coherence demands that legal rules
of statutory scheme reflect unitary vision and be consistent).
218. But see Revesz, supra note 29, at 1161 (suggesting that small number of cases denied
review by Supreme Court undermines view that docket incapacity prevents Court from resolving
conflicts among circuits).
219. Cf Dreyfuss, supra note 206, at 14 (indicating that Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit
will not have attained congressional goals without development of accurate as well as uniform
law).
220. SeeRevesz, supranote 29, at 1117-18 (explaining that courts today deal with increasingly
technical cases involving levels of knowledge and expertise beyond average judge (citing HENRY
J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 156-57 (1973))); see alsoSheilaJasanoff&
Dorothy Nelkin, Science, Technology, and the Limits ofJudicial Competence, 68 A.B.A. J. 1094, 1094
(1982) (noting that "surge" of technical disputes "into the judicial arena has produced different
and highly visible problems for the courts, and it is widely believed that the traditional processes
of adjudication are no longer capable of handling many of these disputes").
221. FRIENDLY, supra note 220, at 156-57, cited in Revesz, supra note 29, at 1117-18.
222. A narrow application of law and economics theory may also support this application of
judicial specialization. To wit, certain areas of the law may be so complex or so specialized that
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the special tax2 and patent?24 courts exemplify this need for the
development of substantive expertise as a function of complex organic
law.
That international trade issues present unique complexities should
go without saying. Judge Carman of the CIT attributes the establish-
ment of the CIT itself to the inability of the United States Customs
Court to keep "pace with increasing complexities of international
trade litigation."2  While the policy and practice underlying the
FTZ program may be relatively straightforward by comparison to the
balance of foreign trade law, the underlying complexity and national
implications of the statutory regime nevertheless remain. Thus,
clarifying the CIT's exclusive jurisdiction over FTZ cases ensures that
the complexities and nationwide scope are considered in interpreta-
tions of the FTZ statutory scheme.
B. Negative Implications
Because of its impact on the local tax base and its potential benefits
to local companies and their workers, the FTZ program is one of the
rare instances in which the national policy of export promotion and
trade liberalization may be in direct conflict with the particularized
needs of the local community.26 In one case before the CIT, Phibro
Energy, Inc. v. Franklin,22 the FTZ Board denied the subzone appli-
cation of appellant because of the adverse impact on municipal and
county entities that would stand to lose ad valorem taxes.22' The
Amid in the Phibro case, including Texas City, Texas, the County of
the inefficiencies ofjudicial generalism in regard to those areas undermines the administration
of the judicial system as a whole. See Revesz, supra note 29, at 1118 n.32 (explaining that broad
application of law and economics argument would suggest no use of generalistjudges); see also
Richard A. Posner, Wi the Federal Courts of Appeal Suruive Until 1984?: An Essay on Delegation and
Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 776 (1983) (indicating that survival
of generalist federal courts is perhaps tenuous in light of age of specialization that has
developed as forecasted by Adam Smith).
223. See Revesz, supra note 29, at 1117 (using tax law as example of legally complex field that
may require specialized courts to make current decisions); see also Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized
Courts: A Choice?, 76 NW. U. L. REv. 745, 750 (1981) (arguing that "[w] hat makes tax law unique
is the intricacy and complexity of the scheme embodied in the Internal Revenue Code").
224. See Dreyfuss, supra note 206, at 14-20 (discussing necessity for "sensitivity" to imperatives
of invention in respect to patent law and its successful application in Court of Appeals for
Federal Circuit policy).
225. See Carman, supra note 22, at 247 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18
(1980), repinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. 3729, 3730).
226. Seesupra notes 61-77 and accompanying text (discussing benefits ofForeign-Trade Zones
program, including avoidance or deferment of state and local taxes).
227. 822 F. Supp. 759 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993), reu'd sub nom. without op., Phibro Energy, Inc.
v. Brown, 33 F.3d 65 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
228. Phibro Energy, Inc. v. Franklin, 822 F. Supp. 759, 759-60 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1993), reo'd
sub norn. without op., Phibro Energy, Inc. v. Brown, 33 F.3d 65 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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Galveston, and others, described the local nature of the FTZ dispute
as follows:
The evaluation of "public interest" has followed a consistent pattern
that is constituted of an "evaluation of policy and economic factors,
which included a consideration of local community impact as well
as the effect on other domestic plants producing like products or
the components of the products." Because goods arriving in a zone
for a bona fide Customs reason are exempt from state and local ad
valorem taxes, the effect on local tax bases is obviously one consider-
ation in the economic impact analysis.2"
In the FTZ context, therefore, an implicit weighing of local and
national interests is present. One could argue that because differing
values may result in outcomes that account for these competing
interests, a decentralized approach is justified.2" The fact that local
interests must be considered, however, does not necessarily justify a
less than uniform approach. Indeed, one of the reasons to avoid
forum shopping in this context is to prevent potential FTZ applicants
from using the international trade jurisprudence of particular federal
circuits as the basis for site selection for industrial enterprises. Such
a result, in the extreme, would be a capitulation to the "clear dangers
that local interests in each state would erect trade barriers" at variance
with the constitutionally mandated "vast free trade zone" of the
United States.2"'
The notion that trade law should be centralized has both its
proponents as well as its opponents. In the case of centralizing
authority for international trade issues in a specialized tribunal, trade
law purists might applaud the precision, coherence, and accuracy that
results. Critics of the prevailing structure of the trade system,
however, might oppose centralization on much the same grounds.
For example, the environmental community opposed the passage of
the North American Free Trade Agreement in part because the
cloistered community of trade "experts" seemed to place inadequate
emphasis on public participation and overarching environmental
principles. 2  The Associate Attorney General for International
229. Brief for Amicus at 4, Phibro Energy, Inc. v. Franklin, 822 F. Supp. 759 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1993) (No. 92-06-00394) (on file with The American University Law Review), rev'd sub nom. without
op., Phibro Energy, Inc. v. Brown, 33 F.3d 65 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
230. See Rader, supra note 206, at 1004-05 (citing statement of Sen. Alan Simpson that
specialized courts sacrifice "diversity of opinion stemming from divergent points of view and
sometimes differing strains of geographical philosophy and thought").
231. COBB, supra note 208, at 4.
232. See Dan Magraw, Environment and Trade: Talking Across Cultures, 36 ENV'T, Mar. 1994, at
14,19 (mentioning that"[e]nvironmentalists ... advocate active public participation in all stages
of lawmaking and enforcement" whereas trade community does not encourage such
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Activities of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Dan Magraw,
recently described the difference in viewpoints as the following:
The two communities have different cultures. Environmentalists,
for example, advocate active public participation in all stages of
lawmaking and enforcement. In contrast, the trade community
generally does not encourage such involvement as strongly. Each
community has different values and sacred cows.23
While environmentalists' discomfort with centralizing international
trade review in an "expert court" is understandable, it would also be
hypocritical without similarly criticizing the current federal decision
to centralize review of certain U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
decisions in one court-the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.3 4 In addition, it seems reasonable to expect the
consistent application of existing law by a competent CIT to be fully
realized, and then for Congress to make any necessary adjustments to
the trade law accordingly in order to make sure that all interests are
fairly represented before tribunals. Anything less than statutory
direction from Congress would be "passing the buck."
2
1
Legal purists and opponents of particular trade policies may fear an
international trade jurisprudence that results from "a legal system
fractured into substantive areas with a set of special judges for each
area."' There is, however, little guarantee that courts of general
expertise will function any better in handling FTZ cases, and there is
some reason to suspect that they would be handicapped.237
involvement).
233. Id. For a recent example, see Scott H. Segal, Reoniling Trade and the Environment
(Again): Venezuela, GATT, and the Refining of Gasoline, 24 STATE B. TEX. ENvr'L LJ. 193, 196
(1994) (reaching decisions "without public participation" chooses "the closed trade paradigm
over the open environmental paradigm").
234. See Rader, supra note 206, at 1010 n.30 (indicating that Court of Appeals for District of
Columbia Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction for certain Environmental Protection Agency orders
under Clean Air Act); see also Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1) (1988) (limiting forum in
which certain petitions for review under this Act may be brought to Court of Appeals for District
of Columbia).
235. See Rader, supra note 206, at 1004 (quoting Sen. Max Baucus' (D-Mont.) statement
regarding creation of new judicial forum without Congress clarifying law).
236. 127 CONG. REc. 29,862 (1981) (statement of Sen. Max Baucus) (arguing against
creation of specialized courts, specifically Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit).
237. Aside from the inadequate expertise of general courts, diversion of complex but
coherent areas of law to specialized courts may allow general courts the resources to assure
litigants the "fresh outlook and broad viewpoint" they deserve. SeeRevesz, supra note 29, at 1120
(quotingJustice Scalia). Justice Scalia further noted that, "if, through such specialized courts,
a substantial amount of business could be diverted from the regular federal courts, the latter
would have a chance of remaining in the future what they have been in the past." Id.
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C. Precedential Implications
The general history of specialized federal courts is not a particularly
pleasant one. Indeed, Congress has already abolished a substantial
number of specialized courts. 21 And, as the history of the establish-
ment of the Federal Circuit itself indicates, broad institutional
opposition exists to establishing more specialized courts.3 9 In the
case of current specialized federal courts, including the CIT, however,
Congress has been tempted to lead by historical example. Professor
Kenneth R. Redden, at the conclusion of his exhaustive work on
federal special court litigation, remarked that there are "no immedi-
ate plans" for implementation of recommended new special courts
because of noted historic failures, such as the short-lived Commerce
Court (1910-1913).2 o
Unifying the jurisdiction of the CIT to include FTZs, along with
other ancillary issues, may give the CIT the opportunity to demon-
strate the precision, coherence, and accuracy of a paradigmatic case
of federal court of special jurisdiction-joining with the successes
previously experienced in the tax and patent areas. By further
resolving the "confusing and costly jurisdictional maze which is
seemingly designed to deny litigants easy access" to the CIT,241 the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has demonstrated that it is
possible for a federal specialized court like the CIT, that deals with
complex policy issues, to confront successfully a complicated and
rapidly changing field like international trade.242 While jurisdiction-
al confusion was present, "the goals of national uniformity and
expeditious resolution of conflicts" remained "evanescent."24 3
With the jurisdiction of the CIT becoming increasingly clear, it
bears reviewing some of the specialized courts that may be waiting in
the wings. Proposals have been made for the establishment of a
federal science court, a special labor court, a court for tax appeals,
238. See KENNETH I. REDDEN, FEDERAL SPECIAL COURT LITIGATION 498 (1982) (listing
specialized courts that have been abolished, including Commerce Court, Court of Indian Claims,
Court of Private Land Claims, Chickasaw Indian Court, and Indian Reservation Court).
239. Indeed, Senator Baucus and others argued that the establishment of a Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit could undermine existing regional circuits and could lead to the
establishment of more courts of specialized jurisdiction. For a discussion of congressional
debate on this issue, see Rader, supra note 206, at 1004-09.
240. REDDEN, supra note 238, at 498.
241. Carman, supra note 22, at 250.
242. See Conoco, Inc. v. United States Foreign-Trade Zones Bd., 18 F.3d 1581, 1590 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (holding that CIT had jurisdiction to review decisions of FIZ Board).
243. Carman, supra note 22, at 250.
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and various other administrative courts.' 4 The Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1972 even directed the President to study the
feasibility of an Environmental Court34' The concept of a court to
specialize in scientifically technical matters, such as the environment,
has a lengthy pedigree. Judge Learned Hand once remarked:
[T]he extraordinary condition of the law which makes it possible
for a man without any knowledge of even the rudiments of
chemistry to pass upon such questions as these.... How long we
shall continue to blunder along without the aid of unpartisan and
authoritative scientific assistance in the administration ofjustice, no
one knows; but all fair persons not conventionalized by provincial
legal habits of mind ought, I should think, unite to effect some
such advance.
24
Just as the centralization of federal government appeals in the Federal
Circuit prompted much skepticism in Congress,' the compelling
equities at play in an environmental court would be difficult-if not
impossible-to reconcile. 2' s  Determining a competent and consis-
tent approach to judicial resolution of environmental disputes,
however, may itself be important to emerging international trade
policy.249 Regardless, the emergence of the CIT as a specialized
244. See REDDEN, supra note 239, at 498 (listing several types of specialized courts that have
been considered for implementation, including Environmental Court, Federal Science Court,
Labor Court, Patent Court, Court of Tax Appeals, Administrative Appellate Court, and
Intermediate Appellate Court).
245. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, 899
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.); see also REDDEN, supra note 239, at 498
(stating that Federal Water Pollution Control Act directed President to consider Environmental
Court).
246. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), modlJied, 196 F.
496 (2d Cir. 1912). Judge Hand has beenjoined by a number of recent writers, includingJudge
David Bazelon and legal scholar Gary Ahrens. SeJasanoff & Nelkin, supra note 220, at 1094
(citing Gary Ahrens' remarks that traditional legal institutions and structures were in danger of
becoming outdated in new science and technology based era and Judge Bazelon's comments
that many scientific and technical disputes fall outside competence of present courts and
therefore involvement in settling disputes arising from them should be limited).
247. See 127 CONG. REG. 29,862 (1981) (statement of Sen. Max Baucus) (arguing against
creation of Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit as specialized court).
248. For a spirited exchange regarding the propriety of an environmental court, see Albert
R. Matheny & Bruce A. Williams, Scientiiw Disputes and Adversary Procedures in Polk -Making. An
Evaluation of the Science Court, 3 LAW & POLY Q. 341, 341-64 (1981); see also Arthur Kantrowitz,
A Response to Matheny and Williams, 3 LAW & POL'Y Q. 365, 365-68 (1981) (defending proposal
for science court); Albert R. Matheny & Bruce A. Williams, A Repy, 3 LAW & POLy Q. 369, 369-
70 (1981) (responding to Dr. Kantrowitz's criticisms of their article and his defense of science
court proposal).
249. SeeTRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND Policy xv (Durwood Zaelke
et al. eds., 1993) ("Far from a level playing field, the widely divergent systems of environmental
laws, rules, and regulations around the globe can create an unnavigable obstacle course for
trade. Without some degree of mutually acceptable discipline, haphazard environmental
protections are ripe for protectionist picking."); U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT:. CONFLICTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 3 (1993) (indicating
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court with more defined jurisdictional boundaries should enhance the
prospects of more efficient and competitive international trade
relations and transactions.
CONCLUSION
The historical evolution of a specialized forum for reviewing trade
disputes has taken a small step toward realizing some of the goals that
Congress envisioned when it enacted the Customs Courts Act of 1980.
With the recent decisions in Conoco and Miami Free Zone Corp., the
courts finally are providing a degree of certainty and uniformity for
trade litigants in choosing the appropriate forum for judicial relief.
Although these decisions only address disputes relating to foreign-
trade zones, both decisions represent an important precedent in
defining whether relief is properly sought in either the district courts
or under the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIT.
Conoco and Miami Free Zone Corp. foreshadow further demarcation
of the jurisdictional boundaries of the CIT. The district courts appear
ready to cede jurisdiction to the CIT over a wide range of trade
disputes, relating not only to the collection of revenue, but also to
situations involving non-revenue raising statutes designed to facilitate
international commerce. Similarly, the CIT and the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit have expressed their willingness to assert
exclusive jurisdiction over cases based on the CIT's residual jurisdic-
tional provision, especially in those instances where relief under other
provisions is unavailable, inequitable, inefficient, or otherwise a waste
of litigants' and the courts' time and resources.
Clarifying the CIT's exclusive jurisdiction and consolidating the
review of FTZ cases, and perhaps other trade cases in the future, has
the potential to further several principles of jurisprudence. The
precision of judicial review could be enhanced thereby fostering
horizontal equity. The coherence of decisionmaking could be
improved by insuring that decisions are consistently applied based on
common interpretations of the underlying statute. Also, the accuracy
of the decisions could be increased as the CIT utilizes its experience
and expertise on increasingly complex trade disputes. Successes in
specialized courts also may embolden innovators to fashion appropri-
ate judicial responses for other complex, technical policy areas. In
any event, if the pattern of court decisions continues, the end result
should be that trade litigants-especially in FTZ cases-will have more
that potential for conflict between environmental interests and international trade has been
increasing).
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confidence that cases will now be decided on the merits rather than
decided on jurisdictional grounds.

